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Event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used to investigate neural mechanisms
underlying risk-related decisions over the last 16 years. We aimed to systematically
evaluate associations between risk-taking and ERP components elicited during
decisions and following feedback. A total of 79 articles identified from PsychINFO and
PubMed databases met the inclusion criteria. Selected articles assessed early ERP
components (feedback-related negativity/FRN, error-related negativity/ERN, and medial
frontal negativity/MFN) and the mid-latency P3 component, all using gambling paradigms
that involved selecting between choices of varying risk (e.g., Iowa Gambling Task,
Balloon Analogue Risk Task, and two-choice gambling tasks). The P3 component was
consistently enhanced to the selection of risky options and when positive feedback
(as compared to negative feedback) was provided. Also consistently, the early negative
components were found to be larger following feedback indicating monetary losses as
compared to gains. In the majority of studies reviewed here, risk was conceptualized
in the context of simple economical decisions in gambling tasks. As such, this narrow
concept of risk might not capture the diversity of risky decisions made in other areas of
everyday experience, for example, social, health, and recreational risk-related decisions.
It therefore remains to be seen whether the risk-sensitivity of the ERP components
reviewed here generalizes to other domains of life.
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INTRODUCTION
Risk is defined as uncertainty of an outcome when presented with multiple options with
variable outcomes (e.g., harm or loss), when the outcome probabilities of the possible
outcomes are unknown (Mohr et al., 2010; Euser et al., 2011; Kóbor et al., 2014).
Risk-taking is the tendency to knowingly engage in behavior with potentially undesirable
outcomes (Boyer, 2006). In the economic domain, for example, selecting to gamble large
(as opposed to small) monetary quantities can result in gaining large monetary rewards,
but could also lead to large monetary losses. In this example, individuals selecting to
gamble the large monetary quantities are considered to be engaging in risky decision-making.
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When making a risky decision, one considers the risk-benefit
trade-off between the perceived risks and perceived benefits of
selecting between choices (Blais andWeber, 2006). Everything we
do has some inherent risk, and poor risk-related decision-making
has significant impacts not only economically, but also more
broadly. For example, people might risk acute injury when they
engage in (highly rewarding) extreme sports, or they risk chronic
illnesses when they smoke or take recreational drugs. Most
everyday decisions also require risk-related decision-making, for
example when navigating through critical traffic situations, or in
social conflicts with co-workers or friends.
The neural mechanisms underlying risk-related decisions
have been investigated using event-related potentials (ERPs),
which index neural activity time-locked to an event of interest.
This event may be the presentation of a stimulus, which provides
options with different levels of risk attached, or the execution
of a response, indexing decisions associated with more or less
risk. But more commonly investigated are ERP responses to
feedback from risky decision-making, where ERP responses are
influenced by whether the feedback outcome is positive or
negative. Although risky decision-making can be measured using
behavioral responses to risk-related stimuli alone, ERPs provide
additional direct and temporally precise measurements of neural
processes involved in decision-making (Euser et al., 2011).
Early components of the ERP such as the feedback-related
negativity (FRN), error-related negativity (ERN), and medial
frontal negativity (MFN), along with the mid-latency P3
component, have been investigated extensively in relation to risk-
taking. Other ERP components, the reward positivity being one
(e.g., Holroyd et al., 2011) has been investigated relative to risky
decision-making, and the P1 and P2 components, relative to
general stimulus processing (e.g., Nelson et al., 2011; Lole et al.,
2015). However the reward positivity, P1, P2 components have
been studied far less frequently compared to the FRN, ERN,
MFN, and P3 components, and will not be the focus of this
review. Throughout the review, the term P3 will be used to refer
to the P3b component.
The FRN, ERN, MFN, and P3 components are commonly
elicited during tasks that involve risk-taking, as well as when
processing task-related feedback following risk-related decisions
(Christie and Tata, 2009; Gu et al., 2010; Hassall et al., 2013;
Sambrook andGoslin, 2015). Previous ERP studies of risk-related
decision-making have investigated economical decision-making
using gambling paradigms (Kamarajan et al., 2009, 2010; Leng
and Zhou, 2010) such as the Iowa Gambling Task (Zottoli and
SutherlandS, 1994), the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al.,
2002), and various forms of two-choice gambling tasks (Ma et al.,
2011; Rao et al., 2013). All of these tasks involve some form of
risky decision-making as participants are required to select from
a number of available options, which comprise possible gain or
loss outcomes. These components are time-locked to the onset of
feedback in risky decision-making tasks.
The ERN is a negative-going deflection, peaking between 80–
100ms post response onset and around 250ms from feedback
stimulus onset at medio-frontal sites (Falkenstein et al., 1990;
Gehring et al., 1990; Holroyd et al., 2003; Donkers et al.,
2005; Ullsperger et al., 2014). The ERN is enhanced following
erroneous task-related responses (i.e., following an incorrect
response) and feedback stimuli signaling response errors. The
FRN and MFN are also negative deflections, peaking 250–
300ms post feedback onset at medio-frontal sites (Miltner et al.,
1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). These early components
partially index reward-related neural activity, such that more
negative components are elicited in response to negative feedback
than positive feedback when performing a reward-related task.
For example, the task goal in a gambling task is to maximize
rewards. Loss feedback signals a violation of this goal, as the
expectation is for positive feedback as compared to negative
feedback (Oliveira et al., 2007), resulting in a larger ERP
response to negative compared to positive feedback (Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002). Outside the risk-related area, the FRN
appears to be larger (more negative) for surprising events (Hauser
et al., 2014), and the ERN is implicated in the detection of
endogenous response errors (Yeung et al., 2004), suggesting
that these early negative ERP components are broadly related
to conflict monitoring. The amplitudes of these components
are also influenced by reward magnitude; larger reward-related
outcomes elicit larger (more negative) component amplitudes
(Ullsperger et al., 2014; Sambrook and Goslin, 2015). Typically,
these components are larger following negative as opposed to
positive feedback (e.g., see Euser et al., 2011 for FRN; Goyer et al.,
2008 for MFN; Hewig et al., 2007 for ERN).
The FRN/ERN/MFN components are often referred to
interchangeably in the literature, however they do slightly differ:
the ERN more closely indexes endogenous response errors
(response ERN) and violations of reward-related expectations
(i.e., reward prediction error; feedback ERN); the FRN and MFN
are more closely associated with feedback valence and feedback
magnitude (Masaki et al., 2006; Gu et al., 2010). In the current
review, the term early error-detection components will be used to
refer to the FRN/ERN/MFN. This is because these components
are often not explicitly differentiated in studies investigating
risk-related decision-making, giving rise to discrepancies in
the terminology used to describe these highly interrelated ERP
components.
The P3 ERP component is defined as a positive deflection
between 300–600ms following stimulus onset, commonly
maximal in amplitude at centro-parietal electrodes (Picton,
1992; Polich, 2007). There are several competing views on the
cognitive underpinnings of the P3, based on concepts such as
working memory updating, stimulus categorization, strategic
processing, and evidence accumulation in perceptual decision-
making (Donchin, 1981; Verleger et al., 2005; Yuan et al., 2007;
O’Connell et al., 2012). This component is also thought to index
the evaluation of the task-relevance of incoming stimuli, where a
larger P3 amplitude is observed for stimuli that are perceived as
being more salient or relevant to task goals (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005).
The emotional valence of a stimulus, which refers to the
perception of attraction or aversion toward a stimulus, influences
the P3, such that stimuli with high positive or negative emotional
valence produce larger P3 amplitudes than neutral stimuli
(Johnston et al., 1986). The P3 is also affected by expectation
(i.e., the violation or fulfillment that a given stimulus will
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appear), hence, unexpected or rare stimuli (e.g., in oddball
paradigms) elicit more pronounced P3 amplitudes than expected
stimuli (Donchin, 1981). These association of the P3 with
experimental manipulations has led to the hypothesis that the
P3 indexes general mechanisms involved in the processing of
surprise and belief-updating (Endrass et al., 2016; Kardos et al.,
2016).
So far, there has been no systematic evaluation of risk-
related decisions and ERP components across tasks. Sambrook
and Goslin (2015) carried out a meta-analysis on selected
studies (i.e., not systematic) of the FRN with respect to reward
prediction only, and Walsh and Anderson (2012) also reviewed
selected studies reporting FRN and ERN results (i.e., also
not systematic). These previous reviews focused solely on the
FRN and ERN, hence the P3 ERP, which is also a commonly
reported component, relative to risky decision-making has
not been reviewed; and therefore the consistency of effects
across P3 studies of risk is unknown. Refer to Figure 1 for
example P3 and FRN ERP waveform (adapted from Euser et al.,
2011).
The current study aimed to fill this gap: to systematically
evaluate the evidence for associations between risk-related
decisions and the ERP components that have been identified
as relevant for risk-related decision-making, the P3 and
FRN/ERN/MFN. In doing so, the secondary aim of this
review was to identify how ERP component findings are
associated with aspects of experimental methodology such
as feedback valence, magnitude of feedback, and expectation
manipulations related to risk. This review is important for
two reasons. First, despite 16 years of ERP research, there has
been no effort to systematically evaluate associations between
ERP components in relation to risk-related decisions and
feedback; this comprehensive review will guide future research
methodology and point to novel areas of research for those in
the risk field. Secondly, the components assessed in relation
to risk-related decisions and feedback are not specific to
risk. Review findings, especially those related to experimental
manipulations effects, will enable those in related cognitive
fields to extend more general cognitive neuroscience theories
and integrate risk-related content that is often field-specific.
For example, findings from fields specific to ERPs and risk-
taking can be applied to understanding behavioral risk-taking;
individual differences in risk sensitivity could be determined
based on ERP responses, which could consequently assist with
understanding why some individuals are more prone to risk-
taking than others.
METHODS
Search Strategy and Selection Criteria
PubMed and PsychINFO databases were searched using the
terms (electroencephalography OR EEG OR ERP OR event-
related∗ OR “event related∗” OR “evoked potential∗” OR
“evoked-potential”) AND (gambl∗ OR “risk tak∗” OR “risk-tak∗”
OR “risk perception”) on October 29, 2017. Inclusion criteria
were: healthy participants, original peer-reviewed research
articles, published in English, using EEG methodology and
reporting the P3 or FRN/ERN/MFN ERP components, using a
cognitive paradigm involving risk (defined as active engagement
in a task which involves selecting between options varying
in risk), and reporting on a statistical association between
any ERP component and task-related risk. Studies containing
only clinical populations (i.e., no effects reported for a
control group), studies with a sample size less than 10,
and case studies were excluded. If available, from clinical
studies, only data from healthy controls was included in
the review. The search was not restricted to any time
range.
This review was conducted adhering to the Preferred
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses
(PRISMA) guidelines (Moher et al., 2009). All titles and abstracts
were screened, assessed for eligibility, and relevant data extracted
by two individuals (DC and MG). A total of 735 articles were
found; 209 duplicates were identified and removed from the
search, the remaining articles were further screened for eligibility,
excluding 274 articles during titles and abstract screening,
FIGURE 1 | Example P3 and FRN ERP waveforms. In this example, more positive-going P3 amplitudes are elicited to negative (compared to positive) feedback
between 300 and 400ms at electrode Cz, and more negative-going FRN amplitudes are elicited to negative feedback between 200 and 280ms at electrode Fz Image
adapted from Euser et al. (2011). Image licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License.
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resulting in 252 articles being selected to be read full-text. The
review process is displayed in Figure 2.
The following information was extracted from selected
articles: participant demographics (age and gender distribution),
sample size, risk measure, risk operationalization, experimental
task, the ERP component measured, measurement location of
component, and component measurement type (peak or mean
amplitude or peak latency).
RESULTS
After applying the exclusion criteria, 79 articles remained and
these were selected for the final review. The selected articles
reported either the P3 and/or an early error-detection ERP
component measured during a risk-related task (following a
risk-related stimulus, or in response to risk-related feedback).
All studies employed a gambling task, specifically, the Balloon
Analogue Risk Task (BART), Blackjack, Cued Learning Gambling
Task, Fruit Gambling Task, Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Single
Outcome Gambling Task (SOG), or a Two Choice Gambling
Task. A description of tasks employed in the selected studies can
be found in Table 1. A summary of extracted data is displayed in
Table 2.
The following sections will review the results of the included
studies, organized by task type and ERP component. The results
from the early error detection components (i.e., FRN/ERN/MFN)
are generally reported collectively when referring to amplitude
and latency results in response to feedback. Given that the ERN
can be separated into feedback ERN and response ERN, it is
worth noting that all studies reporting the ERN report their
major findings relative to feedback and not relative to response
selection. Results for the ERN following response errors are
reported separately in this review.
Balloon Analogous Risk Task (BART; 5
Studies)
Three studies investigating the P3 in response to feedback from
the BART found larger P3 components for loss compared to
gain feedback (Euser et al., 2011; Kóbor et al., 2014; Ba et al.,
2016). One study investigated effects of risk-taking and feedback,
and described larger P3 amplitudes when selecting the high-risk
compared to the low-risk option (Hassall et al., 2013). This study
also reported larger P3 amplitudes for large gains and losses than
small gains and losses. Three studies reported larger early error-
detection components for loss than gain feedback (Euser et al.,
2011; Mussel et al., 2015; Ba et al., 2016).
Blackjack (3 Studies)
Only one study reported larger P3 amplitudes in response to
feedback signifying wins or losses of larger (compared to smaller)
amounts of money (West et al., 2014a). This study also reported
valence effects, such that P3 amplitudes were larger for busts
(when a player’s value was larger than 21), followed by losses
(when the value was below 17), and wins (when the player’s
value was above 17 but also below 21). Another study showed
the P3 amplitude to be larger for busts than for gains or losses,
and also reported magnitude effects with larger P3 amplitudes
following large gains/losses compared to small gains/losses (West
et al., 2014b). This study also reportedmodulations of early error-
detection component amplitudes, finding larger amplitudes
for smaller gain/loss outcomes than larger outcomes (West
et al., 2014b). Hewig et al. (2007) showed valence effects with
larger early error-detection component amplitudes following loss
compared to gain feedback. The study by Hewig et al. (2007) also
reported that, the greater the probability of a gain outcome, the
larger the amplitude following loss outcome.
Cued Learning Gambling Tasks (8 Studies)
One of the six studies examining P3 amplitudes found larger
amplitudes for monetary gain than for loss feedback (Deng
et al., 2012). Two studies reported the opposite, with larger P3
amplitudes for loss than for gain feedback (San Martin et al.,
2013, 2016), and two studies did not find differences between
gain and loss feedback (Pfabigan et al., 2011a, 2012). One study
examined gains and losses relative to whether the feedback
was expected or unexpected, and whether the feedback was
certain or uncertain (based on participants’ estimated outcome
probability), reporting larger P3 amplitudes for gains than losses
in both the expected-uncertain and unexpected-certain feedback
conditions (Kogler et al., 2017). Larger P3 amplitudes for loss
than gain feedback was reported following expected-uncertain
feedback in the same study. Two studies described larger P3
amplitudes elicited in response to both large gains and large
losses compared to small gain/loss outcomes (San Martin et al.,
2013, 2016). The two experiments by Pfabigan et al. (2011a)
reported longer P3 latencies following loss feedback. Pfabigan
et al. (2011b) provided gain/loss feedback using happy and sad
faces, whereas Pfabigan et al. (2011a) provided feedback using
words. One study examined the P3 relative to risk-taking, and
found larger P3 amplitudes when selecting high-risk compared
to low-risk options (He et al., 2013). All five studies examining
early error-detection components reported larger amplitudes in
response to loss feedback compared to gain feedback (Pfabigan
et al., 2011a,b; San Martin et al., 2013, 2016; Kogler et al.,
2017).
Fruit Gambling Task (3 Studies)
All three studies found larger P3 amplitudes in response to
monetary gains as opposed to losses (Luo et al., 2011; Lole
et al., 2013, 2015). Luo et al. (2011) differentiated between two
types of loss feedback; near misses and full misses, reporting
near misses to elicit larger P3 amplitudes than full misses. All
three studies found a similar pattern for early error-detection
component results, whereby loss feedback was associated with
larger amplitudes than near losses (Luo et al., 2011), near gains
(Lole et al., 2015), and gains (Lole et al., 2013). Lole et al. (2015)
also investigated responses to feedback magnitude, reporting
smaller early error-detection component amplitudes for large
gains and losses compared to small gains and losses.
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; 11 Studies)
Three of five studies reporting P3 valence effects identified
larger P3 amplitudes for monetary gains compared to losses
(Mapelli et al., 2014; Tamburin et al., 2014; Ba et al., 2016).
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FIGURE 2 | Flow chart of the search process and article selection for the systematic review (n = number).
One study presented neutral feedback (i.e., no gains or losses)
in addition to gain and loss feedback, and reported larger P3
amplitudes for gains compared to neutral feedback (Azcárraga-
Guirola et al., 2017). Another study categorized participants into
two groups: favorable (participants who showed a pattern of
advantageous deck selection) and undecided (participants who
did not show a pattern of advantageous deck selection), and
reported the favorable group to show smaller P3 amplitudes for
gain outcomes, whilst P3 gain/loss differences were not identified
in the undecided group (Giustiniani et al., 2015). Two studies
found larger P3 amplitudes in response to feedback of larger
magnitude gains and losses compared to smaller magnitude
outcomes (Cui et al., 2013; Balconi et al., 2015). One study
reported larger amplitudes for losses than gains when there was
an 80% probability for a gain outcome and did not find any
significant P3 amplitude differences for gains and losses with
a 20% probability of a gain outcome (Fielding et al., 2017).
Another study did not report any significant P3 associations
(Schuermann et al., 2011). Relative to the early error-detection
components, six out of the nine studies examining valence effects
reported larger early error-detection component amplitudes for
loss than gain feedback (Christie and Tata, 2009; Bianchin and
Angrilli, 2011; Schuermann et al., 2011; Cui et al., 2013; Ba
et al., 2016; Azcárraga-Guirola et al., 2017). Azcárraga-Guirola
et al. (2017) also reported that neutral feedback produced larger
early error-detection amplitudes than gain feedback. Two studies
reported the opposite for the early error-detection components
findings, showing larger amplitudes for gain as opposed to loss
feedback (Mapelli et al., 2014; Tamburin et al., 2014). One
study did not find any significant associations for the early
error-detection components (Fielding et al., 2017). Two studies
examined the P3 relative to risky decision-making: one study
reported larger P3 amplitudes for risky compared to non-risky
option selection (Christie and Tata, 2009), the other study found
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TABLE 1 | Description of gambling tasks in studies included for review.
Task Description Outcomes n
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) Each trial requires selecting whether to pump a
computerized balloon or collect accrued points.
Pumping the balloon gains more points but is
considered risky as the balloon could burst.
Points gained when pumping balloon. Points lost
when balloon bursts.
5
Blackjack The goal is to obtain a value greater than 17,
without going over the value of 21. Selecting more
cards when the value is close to 17 is risky.
Gain of virtual money when value is >17 and <21.
Loss when value is <17 or >21.
3
Cued Learning Gambling Task Cued associations are learned. Selection of a
response associated with a smaller probability of
win is considered risky.
Monetary gain when selecting responses
associated with win cues. Loss when selecting
responses associated with loss cues.
8
Fruit Gambling Task The goal is to yield as many of the same fruit
symbols in four columns as possible. Each trial
requires the selection between two bet options;
selection of the large bet is considered risky.
Monetary win when at least three of the symbols are
the same; all other options produce a monetary loss.
3
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) On each trial, one of four decks of cards is selected.
Two decks are advantageous and two are
disadvantageous. Selection of disadvantageous
decks is considered risky.
Monetary win when selecting cards from
advantageous decks and monetary loss when
selecting from disadvantageous decks.
11
Single Outcome Gambling Task (SOG) Requires selecting between one of two boxes
labeled “10” or “50,” each representing a monetary
value. Selection of the choice with a larger monetary
value is considered risky.
Monetary win or loss of 10 or 50 based on selected
option.
4
Two Choice Gambling Task Requires selecting between two monetary options.
The choice of the larger monetary value is
considered risky. Variations in the values used exist,
with the most common being “25” and “5.”
Monetary win or loss of the value selected. 46
n = number of studies employing the task.
larger P3 amplitudes for high-risk bet selection over the right
hemisphere and larger P3 for low-risk bet selection over the left
hemisphere (Cui et al., 2013). Cui et al. (2013) also reported larger
P3 amplitudes for large gains and losses, than small gains and
losses.
Single Outcome Gambling Task (SOG; 4
Studies)
Gain conditions, which were followed by a monetary gain,
elicited larger P3 amplitudes and shorter P3 latencies, compared
to loss conditions in the two studies examining P3 effects in the
SOG (Kamarajan et al., 2009, 2010). Both studies also reported
larger P3 amplitudes for gains of larger magnitudes than gains
of smaller magnitudes. Kamarajan et al. (2010) also investigated
latency differences, relative to the magnitude of the gain/loss
feedback, reporting shorter latencies for small gain/loss outcomes
than large gain/loss outcomes. Three studies examined early
error-detection components following feedback (Masaki et al.,
2006; Kamarajan et al., 2009; Onoda et al., 2010). Kamarajan et al.
(2009) reported larger amplitudes for gain than loss feedback
and shorter latencies for gain than loss feedback. In contrast,
Onoda et al. (2010) found that amplitudes were larger following
loss feedback compared to gain feedback, and larger amplitudes
to larger magnitude gains and losses as compared to smaller
gains and losses. Likewise, Masaki et al. (2006) reported larger
amplitudes for loss feedback compared to gain feedback, however
this only occurred for error outcomes (small monetary gain on
gain outcomes and large monetary loss on loss outcomes were
considered as error outcomes in this study).
Two Choice Gambling Tasks (46 Studies)
P3 Effects
Out of the 24 studies reporting P3 feedback effects for gains
and losses, 19 studies reported larger P3 amplitudes for gains
compared to losses (Wu and Zhou, 2009; Leng and Zhou, 2010,
2014; Polezzi et al., 2010; Rigoni et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2011;
Nelson et al., 2011; Ibanez et al., 2012; Luo and Qu, 2013; Yang
et al., 2013, 2015; Zhang et al., 2013, 2014; Mushtaq et al., 2015;
Zheng and Liu, 2015; Zhu et al., 2015, 2017; Kardos et al., 2016;
Zhao et al., 2016). Two studies did not find amplitude differences
between gain and loss outcomes (Santesso et al., 2011; Telpaz and
Yechiam, 2014), and three studies reported the opposite findings
(Schuermann et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2015; Endrass et al., 2016).
Five studies did not report any valence effects (Oberg et al., 2011;
Sun et al., 2015; Mushtaq et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2017; Watts
et al., 2017). Nine out of the 11 studies reporting magnitude
effects found consistent results with a larger P3 amplitude
for larger magnitude outcomes than for smaller magnitude
outcomes, irrespective of whether it was a gain or loss (Wu and
Zhou, 2009; Polezzi et al., 2010; Rigoni et al., 2010; Santesso et al.,
2011; Ibanez et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2013, 2015; Zhao et al.,
2016; Wang et al., 2017), whilst the two other studies found the
opposite effect, with larger P3 amplitude for smaller magnitude
outcomes compared to larger magnitude outcomes (Zhang et al.,
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2013; Mushtaq et al., 2016). Watts et al. (2017) reported larger
P3 amplitudes in response to unexpected gains compared to
expected gains. Two studies explored P3 differences following
feedback from high-risk (possible large magnitude gain/loss) and
low-risk (possible small magnitude gain/loss) options (Zheng
and Liu, 2015; Zheng et al., 2015). One study found the P3
amplitude to be larger after gains than losses following the high-
risk but not following the low-risk option (Zheng et al., 2015),
and the other study found a larger P3 for feedback from high-
risk compared to low-risk outcomes (Zheng and Liu, 2015).
Six studies assessed risky decision-making in relation to P3
amplitudes (Oberg et al., 2011; Schuermann et al., 2012; Rao
et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015; Zheng and Liu, 2015; Zheng et al.,
2015). All the studies, except Zheng and Liu (2015), found larger
P3 amplitudes when selecting the high-risk option compared to
the low-risk option. In the study by Zheng and Liu (2015), the
effect of loss and gain feedback was only significant following
high-risk option selection.
Early Error-Detection Component (FRN/ERN/MFN)
Effects
Out of the 43 studies measuring early error-detection
components, 34 studies reported larger amplitudes for loss
than for gain feedback (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2006, 2009; Goyer et al.,
2008; Li et al., 2009; Wu and Zhou, 2009; Gu et al., 2010; Leng
and Zhou, 2010, 2014; Marco-Pallares et al., 2010; Polezzi et al.,
2010; Rigoni et al., 2010; Nelson et al., 2011; Santesso et al.,
2011; Heitland et al., 2012; Ibanez et al., 2012; Schuermann
et al., 2012; Zottoli and Grose-Fifer, 2012; Leicht et al., 2013;
Luo and Qu, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013, 2014; Zhu et al., 2014,
2016a,b; Mushtaq et al., 2015, 2016; Sun et al., 2015; Endrass
et al., 2016; Kardos et al., 2016; Kokmotou et al., 2017; Wang
et al., 2017; Watts et al., 2017). Ma et al. (2011) reported the
opposite effect, showing larger early error-detection component
amplitudes in response to gain feedback compared to loss
feedback. Marco-Pallares et al. (2010) showed a pronounced
positivity in response to gains, whilst reporting a pronounced
early error-detection component negativity for losses. The two
experiments by Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004) reported different
early error-detection component results, such that one reported
larger early error-detection component amplitudes for loss than
gain feedback, while the other study did not find an effect of
outcome. The authors more specifically investigated the ERN,
with one of their studies finding larger amplitude responses for
only error trials compared to the correct trials. Four studies did
not find significant amplitude differences between gain and loss
feedback (Yang et al., 2013, 2015; Telpaz and Yechiam, 2014; Zhu
et al., 2015), while four other studies did not report early error-
detection component differences between gain and loss feedback
(Oberg et al., 2011; Zheng and Liu, 2015; Zheng et al., 2015; Zhu
et al., 2017). Relative to reward magnitude and feedback valence,
larger amplitudes were observed in response to larger magnitude
feedback than smaller magnitude feedback in two of 10 studies
(Yu and Zhou, 2006; Wang et al., 2017). Five studies showed
the opposite, with larger amplitudes in response to smaller
magnitude feedback (Wu and Zhou, 2009; Santesso et al., 2011;
Luo and Qu, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2014). Two
studies also reported this pattern of results, however only for gain
feedback (i.e., larger amplitudes in response to small than large
gains; Li et al., 2009; Zottoli and Grose-Fifer, 2012). One study
reported smaller amplitudes in response to large and small loss
feedback compared to a large magnitude gain feedback (Ibanez
et al., 2012). The study by Yu and Zhou (2009) investigated the
feedback ERN following gamble/no gamble choice responses
separately to the FRN following feedback in the same study,
and reported larger ERN amplitudes following feedback when
selecting to gamble than when selecting not to gamble. Three
studies examined error-related negativity component amplitudes
relative to risky decision-making (Oberg et al., 2011; Zheng
and Liu, 2015; Zheng et al., 2015). Interestingly, Oberg et al.
(2011) observed an early error-detection component following
feedback for risky decision-making, but not following low-risk
decision-making. Zheng et al. (2015) reported larger amplitudes
for high-risk compared to low-risk option selection, whereas
Zheng and Liu (2015) found larger amplitudes for high-risk
compared to low-risk option selection for only gain outcomes
(i.e., no difference in amplitude for high-risk and low-risk option
selection for loss outcomes).
DISCUSSION
A total of 79 studies were identified that examined the P3 ERP
component and early error-detection ERP components (here
collectively referring to FRN, ERN, and MFN), elicited following
risk-related decisions or task feedback. Results were largely
consistent across studies. Larger P3 amplitudes followed feedback
that indicated monetary gains compared to losses, and P3
amplitudes were larger for gains of a larger magnitude. Generally,
larger (more negative) early error-detection components were
found following loss feedback, as compared to gain feedback.
The P3 Component
P3 component amplitudes can bemodulated by a range of factors:
salience, task relevance, stimulus probability, surprise, novelty,
and attention (Kok, 2001; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Patel and
Azzam, 2005). Recent findings suggest that P3 amplitude is
linked to belief-updating: surprising information, which requires
integration into current internal working models, tends to
elicit larger amplitudes compared to non-surprising information
(Mars et al., 2008; Bennett et al., 2015).
The P3 Component in Relation to Risky
Decision-Making
Studies assessing P3 amplitudes in relation to decision-making
consistently reported larger P3 amplitudes when participants
selected the riskier option (e.g., Christie and Tata, 2009; Oberg
et al., 2011; Schuermann et al., 2012; Cui et al., 2013; Hassall
et al., 2013; He et al., 2013). These findings indicate that the
variability in outcomes following a decision (i.e., the level of
risk) can be evaluated rapidly following stimulus onset, which
may influence P3 amplitudes through secondary mechanisms, as
discussed below.
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The P3 amplitude modulations can be explained by a
greater emotional salience attribution to gaining rewards as
opposed to losing, as the task goal is to gain as much
reward as possible. By making the high-risk option more
salient than the low-risk option, there is potential for a larger
gain than in the low-risk option. However, choosing the
high-risk option also entails losing a large amount, whereas
selecting the low-risk option involves losing a small amount.
Individuals tend to show greater sensitivity toward the possibility
of losing compared to the possibility of gaining rewards
(Tom et al., 2007). Selecting the high-risk option involves
dealing with a greater level of threat, and the subjective
influence of loss outcomes is believed to be twice that of
gain outcomes (Tom et al., 2007). Therefore, the larger
P3 may reflect the evaluation of the potential for a loss
outcome.
Demonstrations of a larger P3 in response to the selection
of the risky option can also be explained by Prospect Theory
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). According to this theory,
individuals maximize expected utility by choosing an option
with the highest expected return. Decision-making requires the
evaluation of the expected value, the value of an outcome
and the probability of obtaining that outcome (Sambrook
et al., 2012). The tendency to be loss aversive during risky
decision-making can be attributed to the phenomenon that
losses are perceived as more negative than the positive
evaluation of equivalent gains. Hence, the possibility of loss
from selecting a risky option could suggest increased deliberation
and evaluation of the option (e.g., considering previous trial
outcomes following the risky option), and this could be reflected
by the larger P3 amplitudes for high-risk relative to low-risk
option selection.
Another factor to consider when understanding these results
is that, in the selected studies, selecting the high-risk option
is likely to be more salient than in a real-world setting. This
is because participants were aware that if they performed
poorly, they nevertheless did not lose money. Participants
might therefore have been more motivated to choose the
risky option. This is in line with suggestions that the P3
amplitude is more affected by the overall task-relevance of the
stimulus (i.e., maximize monetary net gain in this case) than
by the valence of the stimulus (Nieuwenhuis, 2011). Taken
together, these considerations suggest that selecting the high-
risk option might have been of greater value to the decision-
makers than the low-risk option in these specific decision-
making contexts.
The P3 in Response to Reward Outcome
Feedback
The majority of reviewed studies found larger P3 amplitudes
in response to positive feedback indicating a monetary gain. In
many studies, participants were aware that their outcome could
result in a monetary gain following the experiment based on
their performance. Early work on the P3 has indicated high-value
stimuli to produce larger amplitudes than low-value stimuli,
with amplitudes being proportional to the amount of monetary
reward associated with a stimulus outcome (Johnston et al.,
1986).
Studies finding greater P3 amplitudes following positive
feedback might be reflective of the affective (i.e., emotive)
response when gaining positive rewards to be stronger than
when obtaining a negative outcome (Luo and Qu, 2013; Leng
and Zhou, 2014). These results suggest that such subjective
affective evaluations take place from approximately 300ms post
feedback presentation. Furthermore, studies reporting larger
P3 amplitudes for positive outcomes also found an effect of
magnitude, such that larger gains elicited a larger P3 than smaller
gains (Polezzi et al., 2010; Rigoni et al., 2010; Ibanez et al.,
2012; Yang et al., 2015), supporting the idea that stimuli high
in affect can elicit a large P3 amplitude. Individuals’ tendency
to have a positive bias could also be related to these findings,
where individuals favor the integration of positive information as
opposed to the integration of negative information during belief-
updating (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014).
Hence the larger P3 amplitude may reflect this integration of
positive information into an individual’s working memory.
Although it was more common to report larger P3 amplitudes
for gain feedback than for loss feedback, inconsistencies across
the studies may reflect differences in the paradigms employed.
Larger P3 amplitudes in response to gain compared to loss
feedback may be masked by the effect of numerical reward
magnitude. For example, out of the 37 studies using the cued
learning gambling task, fruit gambling task, Iowa gambling
task, single outcome gambling task, or the two choice gambling
task, and reporting P3 valence effects 29 studies reported larger
amplitudes for gain feedback. In these studies, feedback outcome
consisted of the presentation of valence and magnitude of
outcome simultaneously, where the outcome was presented as a
numerical value of the monetary amount won or lost on the trial.
In the eight studies not showing this effect, there were differences
in the paradigm, such that alternative feedback outcome was
presented in addition to the actual feedback outcome following
response selection (San Martin et al., 2013), the feedback was
linked with participants’ outcome expectation (Fielding et al.,
2017; Kogler et al., 2017), or neutral feedback was presented
as a potential feedback outcome in additon to gain and loss
feedback (Azcárraga-Guirola et al., 2017). Two studies used faces
as feedback stimuli along with the magnitude of the feedback
outcome (Schuermann et al., 2012; Endrass et al., 2016), and
another study presented the magnitude first, followed by the
valence of feedback (Giustiniani et al., 2015). Interestingly, San
Martin et al. (2016) provided feedback indicating the valence
and magnitude of the outcome simultaneously; however, the
outcome was presented as colored shapes, participants had to
reason the valence and magnitude of the outcome based on
the color of the shape and the number of these colored shapes,
respectively. This paradigm is different to those showing the
effect (i.e., larger P3 amplitudes for gain than loss feedback),
as unlike the other studies, this study did not use a numerical
value as feedback outcome, and the additional cognitive processes
required to decode the feedback might have masked the P3
effects. The consistent finding in studies presenting numerical
feedback regarding the outcome magnitude could be indicative
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of the P3 amplitude reflecting the processing of the value of
numerical reward magnitudes.
Findings regarding feedback and the P3 differed for Blackjack
and the BART. In Blackjack tasks, P3 amplitudes were larger
following wins compared to losses, whereas the opposite pattern
was found for the BART. The Blackjack gambling task is different
to the other gambling paradigms as, for optimal performance,
participants are constantly required to evaluate their current state
in the game. This influences the decisions that the participant
makes, that is, whether to stay with the current set of cards or
select another card (West et al., 2014a). In this task, losses might
lead to larger belief-updates (Endrass et al., 2016; Kardos et al.,
2016), and therefore to larger P3 amplitudes following losses.
Similarly, the BART also taps into constant updating of working
memory during the task, as participants are able to infer that, as
the task continues, the chance of the balloon bursting increases
(Kóbor et al., 2014). The findings from the study by Ba et al.
(2016) support this idea as this study employed both the IGT
and the BART and reported opposite P3 feedback effects from
the same participant sample.
Greater salience for positive feedback compared to negative
feedback may also be induced by the experimental manipulation
in the tasks. Negative feedback did not result in a negative
outcome for participants as none of the studies required
reimbursement from participants for the amount of money they
had lost, if the total gambling outcome resulted in a loss of
money. This is different to positive feedback in studies that
paid participants their winnings, where participants received a
monetary reward proportionate to their performance on the
task. Hence, in these studies the reward feedback is more
salient compared to studies where participants did not receive
their winnings. However, the fact that the results were largely
comparable between studies in which a monetary bonus was paid
out based on performance and those studies in which no such
bonus was paid suggests that another factor could account for
the findings. One such factor could be the task goal: participants
were instructed to gain as many rewards as possible during the
task; hence, they might have been likely to attribute salience to
positive feedback as it is task-relevant.
Larger P3 amplitudes were also found for unexpected
feedback compared to expected feedback (e.g., Pfabigan et al.,
2011a). This fits with the hypothesis that the P3 indexes surprise
(Mars et al., 2008; Endrass et al., 2016), and is in accordance
with oddball paradigms where larger P3 amplitudes are found in
response to unexpected and less frequent stimuli (Donchin, 1981;
Polich, 2007; Yuan et al., 2007). The unexpected feedback may
reflect a revision of the mental representation, a belief-update, of
the specific decision that leads to the feedback on the gambling
trials (Bennett et al., 2015; Endrass et al., 2016; Kardos et al.,
2016).
Multiple brain regions have been associated with the P3 (i.e.,
P3b): the inferior parietal lobe in the posterior parietal cortex and
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) are commonly identified as
being implicated in its generation (Linden, 2005). The posterior
parietal cortex and TPJ activation are linked with goal-directed
attention and stimulus processing respectively, suggesting these
areas are connected with evaluation of risky stimuli and feedback
from risky decision-making. Additionally, the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) is activated during the integration of information
to internal working models to predict future events (O’Reilly
et al., 2013), supporting studies reporting a link between ACC
activation and the P3 (Smith et al., 1990; Wang et al., 2005).
It is apparent that the P3 provides an important index for
risky decision-making and evaluation of feedback from decision-
making. Synthesis of the findings from the studies examining
the P3 in response to risky decision-making has highlighted
the influence of numerical magnitudes in modulating the P3
amplitude when processing feedback, and has demonstrated
the P3 to be implicated in the evaluation of risky response
selection. Additionally, P3 amplitudes following feedback may
reflect belief-updating, where the integration of information
into one’s working memory is required to shape decision-
making under risk. Feedback-evoked P3 amplitudes may serve
as an important indicator of learning in risk-related tasks with
uncertain outcomes (e.g., Bennett et al., 2015).
Early Error-Detection Components
The early error-detection components are influenced by feedback
valence and the magnitude of outcomes (i.e., FRN, MFN,
feedback ERN), as well as by the detection of unexpected
outcomes and errors (i.e., response ERN). Larger (more negative)
amplitudes are generally elicited in response to negative feedback,
negative feedback of a larger magnitude, and in response to the
detection of endogenous response errors (Holroyd et al., 2003;
Ullsperger et al., 2014).
The majority of reviewed studies reported more negative early
error-detection components following loss as opposed to gain
feedback (i.e., only four out of the 59 studies reporting valences
differences, found the opposite effect). This suggests that the
evaluation of feedback outcome occurs within 250ms and implies
these early error-detection components to be more susceptible
to negative feedback and aversive outcomes (Oliveira et al.,
2007). Early error-detection components may reflect evaluation
of events as being relatively favorable or unfavorable (Holroyd
et al., 2004; Hajcak et al., 2006). For example, under conditions
where only neutral and positive feedback are presented, the
neutral feedback is considered unfavorable when the task goal is
to maximize rewards. Sensitivity to negative feedback can help
guide future behavior through learning which actions are likely to
produce negative feedback, allowing these actions to be avoided
in the future. For example, a study by Cohen and Ranganath
(2007) demonstrated that the amplitude of the FRN could
predict behavior on subsequent trials. The authors found larger
amplitudes to loss feedback when the subject chose an alternate
response on the subsequent trial, compared to when the same
response was selected. This suggests that participants changed
their behavior based on prior performance and experienced
conflict following unfavorable feedback.
The early error-detection components are also sensitive
to expectancy, such that, when engaging in gambling tasks,
individuals tend to expect positive feedback, regardless of the
probability of obtaining a positive outcome (Oliveira et al.,
2007). This discrepancy between expectation and outcome is
believed to result in larger early error-detection components
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with these components indexing the violation of expectations
instead of merely evaluating feedback valence (Mapelli et al.,
2014). Traditionally, only the ERN was considered to result
from reward prediction errors, however studies have reported
findings consistent with the FRN component also being evoked
in response to surprising events (Oliveira et al., 2007; Chase et al.,
2011; Talmi et al., 2013). Hence, it is apparent that early error-
detection components reflect surprise or expectation violations
instead of feedback valence alone (Hauser et al., 2014). These
considerations support the early Conflict-Monitoring theory,
which postulates that the FRN is responsible for the detection
of errors. However, there are models suggesting that the ERN
might be sensitive not only to error detection per se (Falkenstein
et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1993), but more broadly reflect
the degree of experienced conflict (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001)
and action monitoring (Vidal et al., 2000). Hence, coinciding
instead with Reinforcement Learning theory, which suggests
differential dopaminergic activity relative to expected (decrease
in dopamine activity) and unexpected (increase in dopamine
activity) outcomes, can guide future decision-making (Holroyd
and Coles, 2002).
Dopamine signals can influence the initiation and regulation
of behavior through communication with the ACC, leading
to the integration of reward related information to improve
task performance (Walsh and Anderson, 2012), through
learning stimulus-outcome contingencies. These findings suggest
evaluation (i.e., good vs. bad) and feedback confirming or
disconfirming predictions of potential feedback outcomes are
linked with the ACC. Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated
increased activation in the ACC following monetary loss and
reduced reward feedback (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Bush et al.,
2002), suggesting reward processing to be associated with
this area and supporting the idea that early error-detection
components originate from the ACC (Holroyd and Coles, 2002;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004).
Expectation is more likely to play a role in tasks that
involve learning reward probabilities. For example, in the Iowa
Gambling Task, participants implicitly learn which of the four
decks are advantageous and which decks are disadvantageous
as the task progresses. Likewise, in cued learning gambling
tasks, participants are able to predict outcomes based on
cue associations with outcome probability. In these tasks, the
amplitudes of the early error-detection component could have
been influenced more so by expectation than by reward valence.
Hewig et al. (2007) examined expectation effects and found the
probability of a gain outcome to be predictive of the size of
the ERN amplitude in Blackjack following feedback. Hence, the
type of task can influence the magnitude of the evoked early
error-detection component.
Based on the findings from the early error-detection
components, it is apparent that the valence of the feedback
(i.e., positive or negative) and the subjective probability of
the feedback outcome plays a role in the elicited amplitude,
suggesting that these components are capable of indexing risk-
related decision-making relative to decision outcomes.
Overall, the findings from both the P3 and the early
error-detection components have demonstrated that risky
decision-making in the economic context elicit consistent
ERP responses. While most of these tasks are designed to
operationalize economic risk-taking as it might occur in the real
world, it remains unclear how exactly risk-taking in a laboratory
setting translates to risk-taking in real-world contexts.
Limitations and Future Directions
The findings of this review should be interpreted with the
following limitations. All the reviewed studies employed a
gambling paradigm, which is specific to the field of economic
risk-taking (Blais and Weber, 2006). Significantly, employing a
gambling task was not an inclusion criteria, rather, we could
only identify gambling tasks using our search. Results from
these designs may not generalize to all forms of risk-taking.
Future studies could investigate the psychophysiology of risk-
taking in other fields, such as in recreational and social scenarios.
This would help identify how the P3 and the early error-
detection components are related to risky decision-making in
other domains of risk; in particular whether a larger P3 is always
elicited in response to risk-taking, or whether a larger negativity
for the early error-detection component is always observed in
response to negative feedback. For feedback processing following
risky decisions, results might potentially differ depending on
the domain of risk. One of the selected studies integrated a
social aspect to gambling, where individuals competed against
a friend or stranger, and reported P3 and early-error detection
component responses similar to their own when observing a
friend gambling (Ma et al., 2011). However, when the individuals
engaged in the gambling task (i.e., competed with others), results
suggested a less pronounced amplitude difference between gain
and loss outcomes for observation of the friend’s performance
compared to when only observing the game between the friend
and stranger (Ma et al., 2011). This highlights that the inclusion of
social risk factors might indeed change the pattern of results and
could potentially shed light on the cognitive mechanisms driving
the observed amplitude differences.
Only the commonly reported ERP components, in this case
the P3 and FRN/ERN/MFN, were selected to be reviewed. Other
ERP components were also mentioned in the selected studies,
such as reward positivity, however these components were not
explored here given the small number of studies reporting
effects for these components relative risky decision-making and
feedback.
Inconsistent results for the P3 component were obtained from
gambling tasks that involve planning during risk-taking (e.g.,
in Blackjack) and tasks that have a different feedback format
(e.g., using face stimuli, or presenting numerical outcome and
feedback valence separately), suggesting that the P3 amplitude
may primarily reflect belief-updating and numerical processing
of risk, respectively. Hence, future studies could systematically
examine the ERP responses to these cognitive processes in
relation to risk-taking. Quantitative modeling of single trial ERP
component amplitudes (e.g., Bennett et al., 2015) across a range
of risk, expectation, and reward outcome conditions could help
dissociate the contribution of each factor to P3 amplitudes. In
contrast to the P3, early error-detection ERP responses following
feedback appeared to not vary markedly across tasks. Given
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that no one ideal paradigm exists to measure risk, it might be
worthwhile to incorporate different aspects of risk (e.g., risky
response selection, feedback valence, expectation, magnitude of
monetary outcomes), as identified in this review, in one paradigm
and systematically study the effects of manipulating those aspects
on the ERP components in the same participants. The seven
different categories of gambling tasks employed by the reviewed
studies (with additional variances to risky stimulus presentation
and feedback presentation), give rise to ambiguity in determining
the specific manipulations that lead to the magnitude of the
evoked ERP components.
The tasks employed by the reviewed studies varied regarding
the probability of a given outcome. For example, in the BART,
participants are required to pump the balloon for as long as
possible before the balloon bursts as this increases the number
of points one can gain during the task. However, the risk of
the balloon bursting increases incrementally with each balloon
pump, giving rise to balloon pumps later on in the trial acquiring
greater risk potential compared to balloon pumps early on in the
trial. This task feature is similar to Blackjack. On a task such
as the two-choice gambling task, risk-taking is involved when
one selects to gamble the high monetary value as opposed to the
low monetary value on each trial. The level of risk-taking in this
case does not increase with each subsequent trial (i.e., selecting
the high-risk gamble on subsequent trials is no more risky than
the previous trial). Hence, the differences in stimulus frequencies
may influence the level of risk-taking a participant engages in,
consequently resulting in differences in their ERP responses. In
the case of the BART, risk-taking is increased with a subsequent
balloon pump, whereas in a two-choice gambling task, the level
of risk-taking remains consistent as the trials progress.
This review has established that several ERP component
modulations are replicable across a range of gambling tasks
and experimental designs. Investigating individual differences
in these component modulations may be able to determine
whether propensity for risk-taking can be predicted by the
magnitude of these ERP effects. Studies using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have already demonstrated
individual differences in neural activity related to risk processing.
One study, investigating the decision-making phase in a two-
choice gambling task, reported that individuals with a greater
tendency to be loss aversive showed larger blood-oxygen-level
dependent (BOLD) signals in the ventral striatum and prefrontal
cortex for both loss and gain outcomes (Tom et al., 2007).
This suggests that risk-seeking and risk-avoidant individuals
might differ in their sensitivity to negative and positive feedback.
Another study, also using fMRI, examined the sensitivity to risk
anticipation in individuals categorized as having high and low
risk preferences (i.e., risk-seekers and risk avoiders respectively)
in a binary gambling task, and reported that risk-seekers showed
reduced activation in the ventral striatum and anterior insula
when anticipating a risk outcome compared to risk-avoiders
(Rudorf et al., 2012).
The early error-detection components, which have not
been differentiated here (reflecting how they are commonly
conflated in the risk literature) are believed to index at least
two distinct cognitive processes: one is the immediate response
to error commission, which occurs around 100ms following
an erroneous action, and the other process is triggered by
feedback for an action, which occurs approximately 250ms
following feedback (Holroyd et al., 2003). However, in many
of the selected studies, the time windows and terminology
were used interchangeably, which prevented clear dissociations
between components in this review. We suggest that future
studies employ clearer operationalized definitions of these
components, allowing for a more refined picture of the
FRN, ERN, and MFN in relation to risk-taking to emerge.
Additionally, a meta-analysis of the selected studies was not
conducted as many studies did not report effect sizes for ERP
component amplitude differences. Future studies should report
effect sizes and measures of uncertainty such as confidence
intervals, which are often much more informative than p-
values.
CONCLUSIONS
There are consistent effects across studies linking larger P3
amplitudes to increased risk-taking and positive feedback to
risky bets, and linking larger early error-detection component
amplitudes to negative feedback following risky decision-
making. Both the P3 and early error-detection components
show consistent associations with risk-taking and feedback.
These associations appear to be reliable effects found in the
context of the majority of risk-related decision-making tasks.
We hope that these findings inform future research in the
risk field, especially in terms of moving beyond gambling
tasks into other risk-related domains, and employing identified
experimental manipulation effects to further untangle risk-
related neural mechanisms. Review findings also have utility
in other cognitive domains outside of risk-related decisions
and feedback, as these ERP components are not specific to
risk.
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